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SENTENCING REFORM LESSONS: FROM
THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984
TO THE FEENEY AMENDMENT
ROBERT HOWELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than two decades, Congress has been on a mission to obtain
uniformity in the federal sentencing system. What began with the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA"), and was soon followed by the
Sentencing Guidelines, has been continually criticized by both the judiciary
and the legislature.1 In the spring of 2003, in what caught many interested
parties off guard, Congress abruptly responded to the perceived
inadequacies of the federal sentencing system by enacting the Feeney
Amendment to the PROTECT Act ("The Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools
Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003"), signed into law
by President Bush on April 30, 2003.2 The Act implemented sweeping
reforms focused on eliminating trial judges' discretion to deviate from
congressionally mandated sentences.3
J.D. Candidate 2005, Northwestern University School of Law.
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2019 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
2 Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.);
Ian Urbina, New York's Federal Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2003, at B 1.
3 On June 24, 2004 the Supreme Court issued a significant decision which may affect the
constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guideline system. In Blakely v. Washington, the
Court overturned the sentence of a Washington state defendant on the grounds that the facts
the judge used to impose a sentence above the prescribed sentencing range were not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). In doing so, the Court read
Apprendi v. New Jersey broadly. 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Stephanos Bibas, Blakely's Federal
Aftermath, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 331 (2004). Apprendi held that every fact that raises a
defendant's sentence above the statutory maximum is an element of the crime. 530 U.S. at
490. Therefore prosecutors must charge them in indictments and prove them to juries
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The goal and structure of the SRA was to achieve uniformity in federal
sentencing.4 However, the PROTECT Act was enacted as a response to
growing congressional sentiment in opposition to the post-SRA sentencing
system. This sentiment was based on anecdotal case evidence of post-SRA
sentencing disparity, political pressure to be tough on crime, and analyses
of sentencing statistics. 5 Disparity and inequality in sentencing was often
blamed on trial judges since they hold the ultimate authority to determine
each defendant's sentence.6 Thus, disparity amongst different defendants'
sentences for similar crimes was perceived as resulting from judicial
leniency.7  Congress accumulated information suggesting that judges-
particularly at the trial level-were not consistently following the
congressionally mandated sentencing ranges; Congress reacted by
beyond a reasonable doubt. ld. In Blakely, the Court held that Apprendi applies to any
finding of fact that is required to increase a sentence beyond what it would otherwise be.
124 S. Ct. at 2537. While the Blakely decision "did not explicitly invalidate the [Federal]
Guidelines, that is its unmistakable implication." Marc Femich, Blakely v. Washington: A
Selective User's Guide, MOUTHPIECE, at 6-7 (forthcoming Sept.), available at
http://www.ussguide.com/members/BulletinBoard/Blakely/Artices/Femich.pdf; Blakely,
124 S. Ct. at 2538 n.9. Blakely currently does not impact district court judges' ability to
depart downwards. However, if upward adjustments, upward departures and relevant
conduct are determined not to be severable then the Guidelines may be struck down entirely.
Bibas, supra, at 331. Given the confusion in the wake of the Blakely decision, the Court set
a hearing for Oct. 4, 2004 to review two Justice Department appeals in order to clarify its
impact on federal sentencing. Lyle Denniston, Justices Agree to Consider Sentencing, N.Y.
TIMES, August 3, 2004, at A14. This comment is focused primarily on downward departures
and therefore is unlikely to be significantly affected by Blakely.
4 William J. Wilkins, Jr. et al., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach to
the Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 364-65 (1991).
5 Douglas A. Berman, Deciphering a Rosetta Stone of Sentencing Reform, 15 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 307, 308 (June 2003) ("significant and often varied role that both general
statistics and case-specific anecdotes play in discussions of departure authority"); Brent
Kendall, Senator Urges Congress to Rethink Feeney Amendment, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 23,
2004, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/ ci 03 59?OpenDocument;
Linda Satter, Judges in a Stew on Federal Sentences: Guidelines Seen as Too Rigid, Unfair,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sept. 1, 2003, at Al; Andrew R. Strauss, Comment, Losing Sight
of the Utilitarian Forest for the Retributivist Trees: An Analysis of the Role of Public
Opinion in a Utilitarian Model of Punishment, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1549, 1591-92 (2002).
6 Max Schanzenbach, Have Sentencing Practices Really Changed? A Brief Analysis of
the Feeney Amendment's Real Concerns, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 257, 257 (2004); Edward
Lazarus, Why the Pending Bill That Would Limit Judges' Sentencing Discretion Even More
Should Not Be Passed, FINDLAW, Apr. 3, 2003, available at
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/ lazarus/20030403.html.
' See Schanzenbach, supra note 6, at 257.
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instituting substantial changes to the sentencing structure through the
PROTECT Act aimed at compelling uniformity.
8
The PROTECT Act creates substantial debate as to whether
unwarranted disparity existed in the federal sentencing system, whether the
reforms will prove effective, and whether the reforms themselves will
create new problems of greater magnitude in the sentencing system. While
all of these questions raise very serious concerns regarding the PROTECT
Act reforms, it is equally important to fully understand how and why the
PROTECT Act became law and what, if anything, could have been done to
prevent it. The SRA removed most sentencing discretion from trial judges. 9
The PROTECT Act took another giant step by effectively removing what
little discretion remained. It also served to greatly marginalize the
judiciary's input into federal sentencing policymaking. Therefore, without
a firm understanding as to why Congress felt compelled to reinforce and
expand upon the SRA via the PROTECT Act, the judiciary faces the
possibility of losing what scraps of sentencing discretion and policy input
still remain.
II. THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984
The United States Constitution does not explicitly assign exclusive
jurisdiction for federal sentencing to any one of the three branches of
government.' 0 The Legislative Branch has the power to define federal
crimes and establishes the method and degree of punishment." The
Judicial Branch tries offenses and imposes punishments within the limits set
by the legislature. "2 Finally the Executive Branch determines "where
offenders will serve their time . . . and supervise[s] them upon their
release." 13
8 Berman, supra note 5, at 308; 149 CONG. REC. S5115 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (Sen. Hatch believes the sentencing statistics show some judges
are increasingly undermining the Guidelines).
9 See Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247, 1264-65 (1997).
10 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989).
11 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10; Exparte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916).
12 See Exparte United States, 242 U.S. at 41-42.
13 Mark H. Allenbaugh, Who's Afraid of the Federal Judiciary? Why Congress' Fear of
Judicial Sentencing Discretion May Undermine a Generation of Reform, THE CHAMPION,
June 2003, at 6, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/698c98ddI 01 a
846085256eb400500c0 I/cc80eaafc20ebe0e85256e540074cI 55?OpenDocument&Highlight=
0,allenbaugh [hereinafter Who's Afraid of the Federal Judiciary?].
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For almost a century, Congress maintained a minor and indirect role in
federal sentencing. 14 Congress delegated virtually "unfettered discretion to
the sentencing judge to determine what the sentence should be" within a
typically wide range of potential sentences as prescribed by statute.'5
Therefore, the judge controlled the "various goals of sentencing, the
relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the way in which
these factors would be combined in determining a specific sentence.'
16
Judicial sentences which fell within the prescribed range "were virtually
unreviewable on appeal.' 7  The overarching rationale of the sentencing
system was predicated on "coercive rehabilitation.' 8 Therefore, sentences
were based on the judge ordering a long sentence and the parole board
granting release based on sufficient rehabilitation.' 9
By the 1970s, "there was a broad and rising level of concern in the
Congress ... regarding the pervasive, serious problems of sentencing
disparity. '20 In 1984, after evaluating the sentencing system, "Congress
concluded that the entire system was outmoded and in need of reform."'
'
Congress determined that the "system lacked the certainty necessary to
inspire public confidence" and therefore could not appropriately serve as a
deterrent to crime.2 2 The sentencing system's deficiencies were deemed the
direct result of unwarranted disparity and inconsistency in sentencing
application by the judiciary. 3  Congress sought to reduce this wide
sentencing disparity by enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.24
14 Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing.- The United States Sentencing
Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective
Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 186 (1993).
15 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364.
16 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM
THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, i, B-I (2003) [hereinafter USSC Report] (quoting
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE
OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN
SENTENCES, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA
BARGAINING, VOL. 1, at 9 (Dec. 1991)).
17 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363; Hatch, supra note 14, at 186.
18 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363; Hatch, supra note 14, at 187.
'9 Hatch, supra note 14, at 187.
20 Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 362; S. REP. No. 98-225, at 38 (1983), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221.
21 Hatch, supra note 14, at 187.
22 Id.
23 Id. In making its evaluation of the federal sentencing system, Congress relied upon
statistical studies demonstrating broad disparity of sentences for a given crime and anecdotal
evidence of individual cases. One of the sentencing commissioners testified that "the region
in which the defendant is convicted is likely to change the length of time served from
approximately six months more if one is sentenced in the South to twelve months less if one
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The SRA introduced a new comprehensive scheme for structuring
judicial sentencing discretion that drastically altered sentencing in the
federal criminal justice system.25  The SRA's principle goal was to
eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparity.26  In doing so, Congress
specifically rejected the notion of rehabilitation as a primary sentencing
27objective. Instead, the SRA stated that punishment should serve
retributive, educational, deterrent, and incapacitative goals.28  The SRA
included the following:
1) A clear, concise statement of the federal law of sentencing, including the kinds and
lengths of sentences ... and a statement of permissible sentencing purposes;
2) A comprehensive set of sentencing guidelines to structure and limit the exercise of
judicial sentencing discretion within permissible sentencing ranges, consistent with
the authorized sentencing limits and the enunciated sentencing objectives;
3) An allowance for departures from the sentencing ranges where necessary in
atypical cases to ensure fairness;
4) A requirement that the sentencing judge specifically state on the record the reasons
for the sentence imposed and, if the judge [departs] from the guideline range, the
reasons for the departure;
5) An allowance for appellate review of sentences imposed to ensure correctness of
guidelines application and reasonableness of departures from the guidelines ranges;
6) Abolition ofparole .. 29
is sentenced in Central California .... [F]emale bank robbers are likely to serve six months
less than their similarly situated male counterparts ... [and] black [bank robbery] defendants
convicted ... in the South are likely to actually serve approximately thirteen months longer
than similarly situated bank robbers convicted ... in other regions." Hearings on Sentencing
Guidelines Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong. 554, 676-77 (1987) (testimony of Commissioner Ilene H. Nagel); S. REP. No.
98-225, at 38 (1983)reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221.
24 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 2, 101 Stat. 1266 (1984) (the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was held in abeyance pending the drafting of the sentencing
guidelines and therefore did not become applicable until November 1, 1987); see also Frank
0. Bowman IlI, When Sentences Don't Make Sense, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2003, at A27.
25 Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 364.
26 llene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 928 (1990).
27 Hatch, supra note 14, at 188.
28 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (West Supp. 2003).
29 Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 364-65.
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A. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION AND THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
One of Congress's most revolutionary remedies to the sentencing
disparity problem was its creation of the United States Sentencing
Commission (the "Commission"). 30  The Commission is an independent
agency within the judicial branch "charged with producing a sentencing
guidelines system that would further the [Sentencing Reform Act's]
objectives by curtailing unwarranted sentencing disparity, ensuring
certainty, and providing just punishment."'" The Commission consists of
seven members and prior to the PROTECT Act included at least three
federal judges.32 The members of the Commission are appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate.33 The Commission was charged
with drafting sentencing guidelines, which went into effect six months after
the SRA was enacted.34 Since 1987, federal sentencing has been governed
by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which are annually amended, by the
U.S. Sentencing Commission.35
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were created partly in reaction to a
perception that the previous system produced unjustifiable sentencing
disparities by giving too much discretion to district judges.36 The Guideline
system sought to constrain judicial sentencing discretion by the use of a
grid that set presumptive sentences according to the seriousness of the
offense and the defendant's criminal history.37  The goal behind the
Guidelines was to:
provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility
to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating.... . 38
factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices.
However, the architects of the Guidelines recognized that some measure of
judicial discretion was necessary, since no set of national rules could
30 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 2, 101 Stat. 1266 (1984); 28
U.S.C. § 99 1(a) (2004).
3 1 Hatch, supra note 14, at 189.
32 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2000).
33 id.
34 Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 365.
"5 § 991(a).
36 See Hatch, supra note 14, at 187; Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 362.
37 See Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 367-70.
38 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(2004).
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prescribe the "correct" sentence for every defendant. 39 Thus, each position
on the grid covers a range of sentences, stated in months. 40 The district
judge finds the facts necessary to apply the guidelines, but also has the legal
power to either sentence the defendant anywhere within the range or to
"depart.",4' Departure results in a sentence above or below the guideline
range if the judge finds certain aggravating or mitigating factors.4 2 Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, departures would be relatively rare. The
United States Code prescribes:
[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range ... unless the
court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to
a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described.
In effect, under the SRA, the Guidelines were intended to be mandatory
except in significantly atypical cases.44
B. APPELLATE REVIEW AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Crucial to preventing unwarranted disparity was the SRA's
requirement that the sentencing judge who determines that a departure from
the guideline range is warranted must provide an explanation for the
departure which is subject to a potential appeal.45  Prior to the SRA,
sentencing judges could base their decisions on a wide variety of reasons, or
no reason at all.46 The SRA required that the judge state on the record her
reasons for the sentence imposed and the "specific reason for the imposition
of the sentence different from that described [by the Guidelines] .''4
Without such a reporting requirement, there was concern that "invidious
factors" would be permitted to enter into sentencing decisions.48
Furthermore, the SRA authorized appellate review of sentencing
decisions upon the initiative of the government or the defendant.49 Prior to
39 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996).
40 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1 (2003)
[hereinafter USSG]; Lazarus, supra note 6.
41 Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 372.
42 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (1988).
43 Id.; USSG, supra note 40, at Ch. 1, pt. A.
44 Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 369.
41 Id. at 372.
46 id.
47 § 3553(c)(2).
48 Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 372.
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988).
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the SRA, the trial judge had broad sentencing discretion and sentences
imposed within the statutory limits could not be reviewed on appeal absent
contravention of statutory commands or constitutional limits. 50 In addition
to sentencing errors of law, the SRA authorized review of the correctness of
guideline application, and the reasonableness of sentences falling outside of
the proscribed range.5' The SRA's implementation of reporting obligations
in conjunction with increased appellate review of sentencing decisions
falling outside of the prescribed guideline range was meant to serve as an
effective check on trial judges, and thus eliminate unwarranted disparity in
federal sentencing.
III. CONGRESS POINTS TO DOWNWARD DEPARTURES AS EVIDENCE THAT
THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984 IS "INADEQUATE"
The recent enactment of the sentencing reforms contained in the
PROTECT Act are proof that Congress believes the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 was unsuccessful. The SRA was created with the express purpose
of achieving uniformity in federal sentencing, and Congress determined that
uniformity had not been achieved under the SRA system.52
The congressional basis for determining that the Guidelines and the
Sentencing Reform Act mandates have been unsuccessful is primarily
driven by statistical analysis of the downward departure rate.53 The
downward departure rate has arguably become the sole figure upon which
Congress and the Department of Justice bases its determination of whether
or not the sentencing system is working.54 Typical of the sentiment
regarding the sentencing system, Senator Strom Thurmond, a member of
the Senate Judiciary Committee stated:
[T]he purpose of the Guidelines is being threatened by the increasing trend of
sentencing criminals below the range established in the Guidelines .... Although we
would expect [downward departures] to be more rare as the Commission has reformed
the Guidelines, just the opposite is occurring. Just in the past eight years, the number
of downward departures has increased steadily from twenty percent to about thirty-
five percent of cases, which is more than one out of three. If the trend continues much
50 Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 373.
51 id.
52 Id. at 364.
53 See, e.g., Rep. Tom Feeney, Getting Sentences Right, WASH. POST, April 16, 2003, at
A26; Kendall, supra note 5.
54 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 108-66, at 58-59 (2003); 149 Cong. Rec. H3059, H3066 (daily
ed. April 10, 2003) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
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longer, we will see more criminals being sentenced below the Guidelines than within
them.
55
The difficulty in relying on a downward departure figure is that there
are several different reasons a departure can occur. Some departures are
left solely to the discretion of the trial judge, such as departures based on
aberrant behavior or a minor role in the offense.56 However, most
downward departures are the result of either a governmental motion, such
as substantial assistance to the government, or efficiency constraints, such
as immigration cases, on particular courts.57 Therefore, when someone like
Senator Thurmond states that thirty-five percent of cases result in
downward departures, there is little way for the public or Congress to fully
understand what that means with regard to the frequency of judges
exercising their discretion to unilaterally depart downward.
The primary statistic on which Congress based it rationale for
implementing the PROTECT Act is the fact that the downward departure
rate has increased from 5.8% in 1991 to 18.1% in 2001.58 In addition, in
2001, only 63.9% of defendants were sentenced within the applicable range,
as compared to 80.6% in 1991.' 9 In 2001, 17.4% of defendants received
substantial assistance downward departures initiated by the government,6°
and 18.1% received downward departures absent a required government
motion.6' Only, 0.6% of defendants received upward departures.62 These
statistics are often used to suggest that judges tend towards leniency, since
upward departures are so rare.
55 Oversight of the United States Sentencing Commission: Are the Guidelines Being
Followed? Hearing before the Criminal Judicial Oversight Subcommittee, 106th Cong. (Oct.
13, 2000) (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond, Member, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary),
reprinted in 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 317 (2003).
56 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b) (1988).
57 Id. § 3553(e) ("upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority [to
depart] to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense"); USSC Report, supra note 16, at i, iv-v.
58 USSC Report, supra note 16, at 31; Gary Fields & Jess Bravin, Federal Judges Aren't
as Lenient as Lawmakers Say, Studies Show, WALL ST. J., October 30, 2003, at A4.
59 USSC Report, supra note 16, at 31.
60 Section 5k 1.1 of the Guidelines provides "[u]pon motion of the government that the
defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines." USSG,
supra note 40, § 5K1.1.
61 USSC Report, supra note 16, at 32.
62 Id.
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As illustrated in the above chart, these statistics seem to indicate a
legitimate concern that the Sentencing Guidelines and the SRA by
themselves have been unsuccessful in achieving uniformity, and could in
fact be growing increasingly ineffective. However, the figures commonly
referenced by members of Congress and the Department of Justice do not
fully portray the state of the sentencing system, and therefore skew the
magnitude of the disparity problem.63
Given that the sentencing reforms were aimed at reducing judicial
discretion, government initiated downward departures cannot be seen as an
abuse of judicial discretion. Downward departures for an offender's
substantial assistance to the government can only be granted upon a motion
by the government.68 Therefore, the determination of the severity of the
downward departure "problem" should be confined to non-substantial
63 See Jonathan Groner, Sentencing Commission Panel Readies for Battle, 230 N.Y. L.J.
1, 1 (2003); Kendall, supra note 5; Schanzenbach, supra note 6, at 257-58.
64 USSG, supra note 40, § 5KI. 1, at 382.
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assistance downward departures.65 However, the exclusion of substantial
assistance downward departures does not in itself provide an accurate
statistic, because the government also initiates a significant amount of the
non-substantial assistance downward departures, such as an early plea,
waiver of indictment or other benefit to the government. 66 For example, in
2001, the government initiated approximately 40% of the non-substantial
assistance downward departures that were granted.6 7 Thus, the true
downward departure rate is closer to 11%, rather then the 18.1% rate which
includes all government initiated departures often quoted by members of
Congress.6' An "acceptable" downward departure rate, although not
explicitly defined, is considered between five and ten percent.69
Another concern expressed by Congress was the disparity in
downward departure rates between judicial districts.70  For example, in
2001 the districts with the highest non-substantial assistance downward
departure rates were the District of Arizona (62.6%), the Eastern District of
Washington (51.5%), and the Southern District of California (50.1%). 7
The districts with the lowest downward departure rates were the Eastern
District of Kentucky (1.4%), the District of South Carolina (1.7%), and the
Western District of Virginia (1.8%).72 Such wide disparity gives the
impression that there is a lack of uniformity in sentencing. However, the
downward departure rates are often directly related to particular crimes
disproportionately affecting certain districts.
Certain districts rely on early disposition policies to deal with
particular types of crimes, or with types of criminals appearing in high
volumes in certain judicial districts.73 For example, southern border states
face extremely high volumes of drug trafficking and illegal re-entry cases;
"fast track" policies are necessary in order to effectively and efficiently deal
65 This methodology is utilized by the U.S. Sentencing Commission and is recognized in
the GAO's Congressional Report.
66 Bowman, supra note 24, at A27; USSC Report, supra note 16, at 45.
67 USSC Report, supra note 16, at 59 (this figure is likely a conservative estimate since
there is incomplete data regarding the government position in almost half of the cases
reviewed).
68 See Charles Lane, Rehnquist Decries Sentencing Law: In His Year-End Report, Chief
Justice is Critical of Congress, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2004, at A02; Groner, supra note 63, at
1; Patricia Manson, Panel Issues Get Tough Sentencing, CH. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 23, 2003.
69 Sentencing Commission Hears Testimony on PROTECT Act Downward Departure
Mandate, 73 CRdM. L. REP. 21 (2003) [hereinafter Sentencing Commission Hears].
70 See id.; Fields and Bravin, supra note 58, at A4.
71 USSC Report, supra note 16, at 35.
72 Id. at 36.
73 Id. at 37.
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with these cases. 74  "Fast track" programs provide prosecutors with the
initiative to grant alien defendants lighter drug sentences to expedite
deportation.75  Fast tracking was responsible for 7.8% of all downward
departures in 2001.76 That same year, 5.1% of all downward departures
stated deportation as the basis." Congress supports both fast track and
deportation programs and acknowledged their value by including them in
the PROTECT Act.7' Not surprisingly, the Southern District of California
has one of the highest downward departure rates: it accounted for 92.4% of
fast track departures in 2001. Similarly, the districts of Arizona and
Eastern Washington granted 72.7% of deportation departures.80 These
districts need high downward departure rates in order to prevent the courts
from becoming congested with drug trafficking offenses and lengthy
deportation proceedings.
A more in-depth look into the district departure rate disparities shows a
more narrow range of departure rates among districts.8 1 Nevertheless,
significant disparities among the judicial districts remain that cannot be
explained by early disposition programs or a particularly high concentration
of a certain type of crime or offender which is unique to the particular
district.
IV. SHARING BLAME: THE JUDICIARY, THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND
CONGRESS
While the downward departure rate is not as bad as some of the
statistics articulated by members of Congress indicate, the fact is that the
Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing Commission's Guidelines have
not achieved the clearly articulated goal of eliminating unwarranted
14 Id. at 44.
75 Gen. Acct. Off. Rep. to Cong. Requesters, Federal Drug Offenses: Departures From
Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimum Sentences, Fiscal Years 1999-2001, GAO-
04-105 at 26 (2003); Fields & Bravin, supra note 58.
76 USSC Report, supra note 16, at 42.
77 id.
78 PROTECT ACT, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §401 (m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650 (2003); Alan
Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Law, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 310 (2003);
Sentencing Commission Hears, supra note 69.
79 USSC Report, supra note 16, at 44.
80 Id. at 45.
s1 Manson, supra note 68 (quoting U.S. District Court Judge and U.S. Sentencing
Commissioner, "I have seen . . . no evidence of any national pattern of abuse... with regard
to downward departures"); Vinegrad, supra note 78, at 314 ("[S]tatistics support one overall




sentencing disparity. 82 At best, the non-substantial assistance downward
departure rate is around ten percent, which is at the highest point of the
range deemed "acceptable."83 Strong arguments can be made as to what the
goals and structure of the federal sentencing system ought to be, but there is
little doubt that if the primary goal is consistency in sentencing among
similar crimes and offenders, then the pre-PROTECT Act system had flaws.
Congress and the Department of Justice may have exaggerated the
magnitude of the system's failings, but if perfection is measured by a
national downward departure rate below ten percent and consistency across
all districts, then something went wrong.84  Congress, through the
PROTECT Act, implicitly lays the blame squarely on the shoulders of the
trial court judges and the Sentencing Commission. However, the reality is
that Congress, the Judiciary, and the Sentencing Commission combined to
contribute to the perception that the sentencing system and the guidelines
were either not working or being ignored.
A. THE JUDICIARY
Federal judges have been seen as part of the sentencing problem and
have played a relatively minor role in the fashioning of sentencing policy.
85
Judges are themselves largely to blame for their absence from a central role
in developing sentencing policy. 86 In addition to their consistent refusal to
acknowledge that unwarranted sentencing disparities are real and unjust,
they vigorously oppose sentencing reform efforts.87 Judges bear the brunt
of the blame for the high downward departure rate and the perception that
different districts and judges are working around the guidelines.8 Some of
82 See Kendall, supra note 5 ("Rep. Bob Goodlatte, R-Va.... said that he, like other
members of Congress, had seen statistics that indicated that judge-initiated downward
departures were too high.").
83 Sentencing Commission Hears, supra note 69.
84 Groner, supra note 63.
85 Michael Tonry, Judges and Sentencing Policy-The American Experience, in
SENTENCING, JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND TRAINING 137 (C. Munro and M. Wasik eds., 1992).
86 Id. at 138.
87 Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the Guidelines: A Call for Cooperation, 101 YALE L.J.
1755, 1758-60, 1767 (1992); Lazarus, supra note 6.
88 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 9, at 1265; Margaret Graham Tebo, Questions on
Sentences: Changes to Guidelines Become a Separation-of-Powers Dispute, 89 A.B.A. J. 13
(2003) ("some members of Congress [are] outraged at what they see as frivolously light
sentences meted out by U.S. district judges"); Ian Urbina, supra note 2 ("Federal judges
have exploited loopholes in the sentencing guidelines ... when a predator commits a crime,
no matter where in the country it occurs, he does the same amount of hard time.").
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this criticism is unfounded. 89 As discussed above, the departure rates are
not as bad as Congress portrays them to be since the vast majority of
departures are driven by the government, or by district-specific problems.
Nevertheless, judges often do tend towards leniency.90 Many judges
believe the Guidelines are too rigid and make efforts to reduce penalties
they perceive as unfair.9' Some high profile judges such as Justice Kennedy
have been outspoken about the harshness of sentences and believe that
sentences should be generally shorter across the board.92 The downward
departure and uniformity in sentencing debate cannot be evaluated without
considering these issues. Too many downward departures may be
interpreted as an expression of leniency, and therefore may be seen as a
subversive attempt by the judiciary to lower sentences.93 This rationale is
supported by the departure statistics. While the downward departure rate
lies somewhere in the teens and has been rising over the last several years,
the upward departure rate resides below one percent, and has been trending
downwards since 1991.94 Certainly, few in Congress have complaints about
the upward departure rate, and. probably would not see a higher upward
departure rate as indicative of a flawed sentencing system. Furthermore,
certain judges do in fact work around the Guidelines and have high
downward departure rates.95 Such individual sentencing practices have a
significant impact on the number of downward departures and disparity in
sentencing, and create a more generalized perception that judges are
working around the Guidelines.
96
89 See Fields and Bravin, supra note 58; Groner, supra note 63, at I (There was a
"misperception created by the Department of Justice in Congress that there is an epidemic of
leniency" and the DOJ provided "misleading statistics" in order to facilitate the Feeney
Amendment's passage.).
90 Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial
Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 298 (2004).
91 Id.
92 Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug.
9, 2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566
d6000daa79/departures/$FILE/JusticeKennedyABASpeech.pdf.
93 Lazarus, supra note 6.
94 USSC Report, supra note 16, at 32.
95 Panel III. Accomplishing the Purpose of Sentencing-the Role of Courts and the
Commission, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 179 (2003) (notes from symposium); Jack B.
Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 357, 365 (1992) (quoting an unnamed judge in the Eastern District of New
York: "[T]he Guidelines ... have made charlatans and dissemblers of us all. We spend our
time plotting and scheming, bending and twisting, distorting and ignoring the law in an effort
to achieve ajust result.").
96 Bibas, supra note 90, at 298-99; Weinstein, supra note 95, at 365.
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By the time Congress passed the SRA, it was adamant that disparity
posed a serious threat to the proper function of sentencing. Prior to the
SRA, the judiciary knew there were sentencing disparity problems;
however, the judiciary as an institution did little to achieve positive
change.97 In effect, because sentencing was historically a judicial function,
the judiciary "thought that no one would ever have the audacity to deprive
them of sentencing discretion."98  Therefore, the judiciary "essentially
ignored the problem until Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act." 99
When Congress finally chose to act to rectify the perceived disparity
problems, the judiciary failed to take a leadership role in determining the
course of reform legislation.'00 By the time the SRA passed, the judiciary
had lost significant power to shape the scope and nature of the reform.'0 '
Subsequent to the SRA, "over 200 district judges held the SRA
unconstitutional" which furthered Congressional disdain for district judges'
sentencing tendencies.
10 2
Similar to their pre-SRA actions, the judiciary was aware of sentencing
disparity concerns prior to the PROTECT Act's introduction, but took few
meaningful steps to enact change.'0 3 By failing to be proactive, the
judiciary ceded control to Congress. Senator Orrin Hatch expressed the
congressional disdain for district court sentencing discretion by stating the
PROTECT Act was Congress' way of saying "we are sick of this,
judges."' 4
B. THE SENTENCING COMMISSION
Much like the judiciary, the United States Sentencing Commission
knew that sentencing disparity existed, and that it was of concern to the
legislature.'0 5 But it too did little to substantively remedy the problem. The
97 Berman, supra note 5, at 308 ("[Tlhe Feeney Amendment's effort to restrict
downward departures was not an entirely abrupt or unforeseeable development. Various
members of Congress and various representatives of the Department of Justice expressed in
various forums significant concerns about increased rates of downward departures in the
wake of the Koon decision."); see also Susan Schmidt, Judge Accused of Misleading House
Panel: Republicans on Subcommittee Say Testimony on Drug Sentencing was Inaccurate,
WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2002, at A18.
98 Lay, supra note 87, at 1757.
99 Id.
'Go Id.
01 Id. at 1758-59.
102 Id. at 1767; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANN. REP. 11(1989).
103 See sources cited supra note 78.
104 Vinegrad, supra note 78, at 315.
1o5 See sources cited supra note 78.
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Commission's primary purpose was to create the Guidelines and make
adjustments and policy recommendations to further the SRA's objectives by
curtailing unwarranted sentencing disparity. 10 6 Given that the PROTECT
Act is a reaction to the congressional perception that downward departures
are too high, it is difficult not to point a finger of blame at the Sentencing
Commission.
The SRA mandated that district judges report on the record their
reasons for sentencing and, in particular, their rationale for any departure
from the Guidelines. 0 7 This data was to be collected and analyzed by the
Commission. 0 8 One of the least disputed problems affecting the evaluation
of the federal sentencing system is the fact that the sentencing data is
flawed. 0 9 In 2001, there were 4,849 cases in which the sentencing judge
did not send a copy of the sentencing report to the Commission. 1 0 The
Commission's own findings state that it is:
acutely aware of the need for greater specificity and standardization in departure
documentation . . . historically [the Commission] has not received a significant
percentage of sentencing documents from a handful of judicial districts . . . often
[courts] provide only general categorical reasons for departure [] with insufficient
specificity to enable the Commission to understand fully the sentencing court's
underlying substantive reason for departure.' "I
This conclusion was made after the enactment of the PROTECT
Act. '1 2 The fact that it took over fifteen years, and a major congressional
sentencing reform, for the Commission to determine it was not receiving
sufficient data by which to evaluate the extent of the unwarranted
sentencing disparity demonstrates a serious problem with the
106 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 994 (West Supp. 2003) (Duties of the Commission); 28
U.S.C. § 995(a)(20) (2004); 28 U.S.C. §§ 995(a)(8), (9), (12)(A), (13)-(16), (20), (21)
(2004).
107 § 994(w)(l)(B); Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 365.
1o8 See generally §§ 994, 995(a)(8), (9), (12)(A), (13)-(16), (21).
109 USSC Report, supra note 16, at iv.; G.A.O. Report to Congress, Federal Drug
Offenses: Departures from Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimum Sentences,
Fiscal Years 1999 - 2001, GAO-04-105, 4 (2003); William W. Mercer, Assessing
Compliance with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: The Significance of Improved Data
Collection and Repo-ting, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 43, 43 (2003); Sentencing Commission
Hears, supra note 69.
110 Roundtable Discussion of the Feeney Amendment: Federal Judicial Discretion, in
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 15, 2003, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/
ci 03_53?OpenDocument [hereinafter Roundtable] (statement by John Steer, United States
Sentencing Comm'n).




Commission." 3  It is especially disturbing given the fact that the
Commission was mandated to curtail unwarranted disparity, and monitor
the effectiveness of the Guidelines on a continuous basis. 1 4  Without
knowing exactly why judges were departing, and why certain districts had
higher downward departure rates than others, the Commission could hardly
work intelligently to remedy disparity problems. The Commission's
shortcoming as the supervisory agency of the federal sentencing system
allowed Congress to justify its need to take control over the system they
perceived to be failing. 15 Without solid statistical proof to the contrary, or
steps taken on behalf of the Commission or the judiciary to rectify or clarify
the disparity issues, Congress was able to react to whatever information
they chose to rely on.
C. CONGRESS
Finally, members of Congress recognize that getting tough on crime
gets them elected." 6 Any legislation with regards to sentencing is apt to
favor tougher sentences, less loopholes, and lower crime rates." 7 Congress
has determined that downward departures are the equivalent of offenders
getting off easy." 8 Therefore, Congressional oversight is fixated on the
departure rate, and compelling the judiciary to get that number within a
palatable range. In its quest to eliminate disparity, Congress reacted
quickly and without much debate or input from the judiciary or
practitioners.' 9
The inaction of the judiciary and the Sentencing Commission in
response to the perceived sentencing disparity problem allowed Congress to
usurp all control over sentencing and led to the reforms dictated in the
113 id.
114 28 U.S.C. §§ 995(a)(8), (9), (12)(A), (13)-(16), (21) (2003); 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(1)
(2003).
115 Kendall, supra note 5 ("[S]tudying downward departures had not been at the top of
the commission's agenda.., and Congress took matters into its own hands.").
116 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Ashcroft and Congress are Pandering to Punitive Izstincts, NAT'L
J., Jan. 24, 2004; Strauss, supra note 5, at 1590-91.
117 See, e.g., Penalties for White Collar Crime Offenses: Are We Really Getting Tough
on Crime?: Hearing on Penalties for White Collar Crime Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs, 107th Cong. 1-17 (2002), available at 15 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 234, 236 (2003); Douglas 0. Linder, Journey Through the Valley of Evil,
71 N.C. L. REV. 1111, 1118-22, 1128-33 (1993).
118 Tebo, supra note 88.
19 See Schanzenbach, supra note 6, at 257; Statement of Senator Edward Kennedy




PROTECT Act. Legislators rarely, if ever, campaign in support of shorter
sentences, or a justice system which better accommodates the individual
needs of offenders. Elections dictate that leniency and the appearance of
being soft on crime is politically risky."2 ° Therefore, the judiciary, and the
Commission in particular, should have been proactive in remedying the
sentencing system. Similar pre-SRA inaction led to a congressional
reaction in the form of sweeping sentencing reforms and significantly
reduced judicial discretion in sentencing. Over fifteen years later, the
judiciary made no changes to alleviate concern over unwarranted disparity,
and it too has resulted in the sweeping congressional reform mandated by
the PROTECT Act.
IV. THE PROTECT ACT
A. FROM THE FEENEY AMENDMENT TO THE PROTECT ACT
The PROTECT Act is best known for its "AMBER (America's
Missing Broadcast Emergency Response) Alert" provision, which
strengthened the federal and state procedures and penalties for investigating
and prosecuting the kidnapping and sexual exploitation of children. 2' The
AMBER Alert bill was introduced January 9, 2003122; it received wide
Senate support and passed with little controversy. 23 On March 27, 2003,
Representative Tom Feeney (R-Florida) introduced an amendment to the
House of Representatives version of the "AMBER Alert" bill, known as the
Feeney Amendment. 24 This amendment was written largely by the Justice
Department.125 The Feeney Amendment proposed far-reaching reforms to
the federal sentencing system. The amendment sought to:
I) eliminate specific grounds of departures (aberrant behavior; family ties and
responsibilities and community ties; military, civic, charitable or public service,
employment-related contributions or similar goods works),
120 See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and
Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 28
(2003); Satter, supra note 5; Strauss, supra note 5, at 1590-91; Taylor, supra note 116.
2' PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.§ 401(h) (1)).
22 PROTECT Act, Bill Summary and Status for the 10 8th Congress, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 108:SN00151 :@@@D&summ2=m& (as of Apr.
30, 2003).
123 id.
124 140 Cong. Rec. H 2420 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep. Feeney); An
Ominous Attack on Judges, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 2003, at A 18.
125 Kendall, supra note 5.
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2) prohibit downward departures based on non-specified grounds,
3) require congressional oversight of downward departures,
4) increase appellate review of departures,
5) limit downward departures on remand,
6) prohibit future downward departure guidelines until 2005, and
7) increase authority to prosecutors (e.g., through "early disposition" programs and
acceptance of responsibility).'
26
The Feeney Amendment provoked outrage from most judges and
many special interest groups.127 It marked an unprecedented attempt by
Congress to re-write the Sentencing Guidelines without input from the
Sentencing Commission or judiciary.' 28  Due to this opposition, and the
work of the Conference Committee of House and Senate representatives,
the enacted version of the Feeney Amendment is substantially narrower
than the original House proposal.129 Despite these changes, however, the
fact that the Feeney Amendment took only thirty days from proposal to
passage, and was subject to very limited debate, outraged many interested
parties outside of Congress. 30 The final version of the Feeney Amendment
as contained in the PROTECT Act included the following reforms:
I) Eliminated or restricted the use of several bases for downward departures
2) Instituted de novo appellate review
3) Required increased reporting of sentencing decisions
4) Increased prosecutorial controls on some downward departures
5) Directed the Sentencing Commission to reduce downward departures, and
126 See H. Amdt. 19 to H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. (2003), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b4l 5ea3a64852566d6000daa79/departures/$FILE/fe
eney.pdf [hereinafter Feeney Amendment as Introduced].
127 These include: present and former members of the Sentencing Commission, Judicial
Conference of the United States, seventy law professors, Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National Legal Aid and
Defender Association, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, American Civil Liberties
Union, American Bar Association, NAACP, National Petroleum Refiners Association, Cato
Institute, Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
128 Douglas A. Berman, Taking Stock of the Feeney Amendment's Many Facets, 16 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 93, 93 (2003).
129 See Berman, supra note 5, at 309.
130 See, e.g., Lane, supra note 68 at A02; Who 's Afraid of the Federal Judiciary?, supra
note 13.
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6) Changed the membership structure of the Sentencing Commission1
3 1
Although significant concessions were made, the PROTECT Act still
marked a significant reform of the federal sentencing system, and included
unprecedented restrictions on the judiciary's influence on sentencing and
sentencing policy. Furthermore, the United States Sentencing
Commission's mandate from Congress to reduce downward departures
subsequently resulted in a sentencing system much like the original Feeney
Amendment proposal. 1
32
B. THE PROTECT ACT AS FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORM
In reaction to the perceived unwarranted disparity generated by the
federal sentencing system, Congress and President Bush enacted the
PROTECT Act (the "Act") and through it instituted a wide range of reforms
aimed at compelling uniform sentencing. 133  The Act contains several
different types of reform, but the purpose and message the Act carries is
clear.' 34 Taken in the aggregate, the Act makes a clear statement that the
judiciary and the Sentencing Commission are part of the problem and will
not play a significant role in crafting a solution to the sentencing system. 135
Through the PROTECT Act, Congress sent the message that it distrusts the
trial judges and sees limited value in the Sentencing Commission as it was
originally constructed under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.136 While
the Act is focused on reducing unwarranted disparity in sentencing, three of
the Act's reforms are particularly blunt. The Act's mandate for heightened
appellate review, reconstitution of the Sentencing Commission, and
increased reporting requirements offer clear indications as to what Congress
blames for the sentencing system's lack of success in the post-SRA era.
1. De Novo Review
Under a properly functioning sentencing system, the courts of appeals,
and not Congress or the Commission, are best positioned to determine the
131 Final Version of the Feeney Amendment, Pub. L. No. 108-21 Title IV, 117 Stat. 650
(2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/.
departures/$FILE/final_feeney.pdf.
132 See Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Sentencing Commission Acts to Reduce
Number of Sentences Below the Guidelines (Oct. 8, 2003), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/relI00803a.htm [hereinafter USSC Press Release].
133 USSC Report, supra note 16, at i-iii.
134 Id.
135 Vinegrad, supra note 78, at 314-15.
136 See Who's Afraid of the Federal Judiciary?, supra note 13.
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appropriateness of departures in particular cases. 37  Under the SRA,
Congress granted the appellate courts the initial responsibility to ensure that
the district courts adhere to the guideline system.138 The PROTECT Act
enhanced the appellate review responsibility for departure decisions by
changing from the previous abuse of discretion standard to a de novo
review of district court sentencing decisions. 39  In doing so, Congress
effectively overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Koon v. United
States, which limited the review by appellate courts of district court
sentencing decisions to the abuse of discretion standard.
40
The Supreme Court unanimously decided Koon v. United States in
1996, holding that departure decisions by district courts were entitled to
deference on appeal and reviewable only for abuse of discretion.' 4 ' The
Court stated that Congress "did not intend, by establishing limited appellate
review, to vest in appellate courts wide-ranging authority over district court
sentencing decisions. ' ,141 In particular, the court cited the SRA's provision
that "[t]he court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the
district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the
findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous."1
43
Further, the Court noted that in 1988 the SRA was specifically amended to
require appellate courts to "give due deference to the district court's
application of the guidelines to the facts.' 44 The Court went on to observe
that district courts have an "institutional advantage" in making the factual
findings necessary to making departure decisions, "especially as they see so
many more Guidelines cases than appellate courts do.' 45
Koon reinforced the standard by which district courts determine
whether a particular factor is a permissible basis for departure:
[A] federal court's examination of whether a factor can ever be an appropriate basis
for departure is limited to determining whether the Commission has proscribed, as a
categorical matter, consideration of the factor. If the answer is no . . . the sentencing
137 See, e.g., Statement of Sen. Kennedy, supra note 119.
138 Michael Goldsmith & Marcus Porter, Lake Wobegon and the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines: The Problem of Disparate Departures, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 66 (2000).
139 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2004).
140 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
141 Id. at 91.
142 Id. at 97.
'43 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4) (1988)).
144 Id. (quoting § 3742(e)(4)).
141 Id. at 98.
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court must determine whether the factor, as occurring in the particular circumstances,
takes the case outside the heartland of the applicable Guideline.
46
Likewise, Koon approved district court judges' ability to depart from
the prescribed guideline sentencing range based on a factor not mentioned
in the Guidelines. 47 The Court determined that any factor not explicitly
disapproved by the Sentencing Commission may serve as a basis for
departure, as long as the overall sentence is in accordance with one of the
statutory goals of sentencing.
148
Koon returned some discretion to the federal sentencing process. It
effectively became a "safety valve" for the trial judge who was required to
apply the Guidelines, but still desired to craft a sentence around the unique
circumstances of the crime and the defendant.1 49 It gave a judge facing an
unusual case the opportunity to alter the sentence proscribed by the
Guideline. 5 °
By providing for de novo review of sentencing decisions, and thus
effectively overturning Koon, the PROTECT Act provides a significant
deterrent to downward departures by trial court judges. Like the downward
departure rate itself, it is unclear whether the pre-PROTECT Act appellate
review process was flawed. In 2001, the circuit courts of appeals reversed
downward departures in seventy-six percent of those cases in which the
government challenged a departure decision on appeal.' 51 Furthermore, the
Justice Department found only twenty five departure sentences worthy of
appeal in 2001.52 In contrast, 340 cases were appealed by the defense and
only 4.5% succeeded on appeal.'
Nevertheless, the PROTECT Act ensures that appellate courts-
through de novo review-now have the ability to reverse sentencing
decisions with which they simply disagree. 54 Appellate courts no longer
need to give deference to the trial courts' sentencing experience and
familiarity with the facts of particular cases. Instead, sentencing decisions
can be altered outside of the context of the circumstances present at trial
and during sentencing. Sentencing is often a highly emotional experience
146 Id. at 109.
"47 Id. at 92-96.
'41 Id. at 95-96.
149 Lazarus, supra note 6.
150 Id.
151 See USSC Report, supra note 16, at 56.
152 id.
153 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS,
109 tbl.57 (2002).
'5 Vinegrad, supra note 78, at 312.
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with victims, the offender and families present. 5 Reviewing the transcript
or documentary sentencing materials on appeal presents a significantly
different experience.' 56 De novo review should lead to more sentences
within the guideline range since the determination can be made outside the
context of the trial. In addition, trial judges may simply be less likely to
tailor a sentence to the individual's circumstances apparent at trial or during
sentencing since they understand that their decisions will be subject to de
novo appellate review.
The PROTECT Act reinforces the Congressional assertion that judges
should have little role in sentencing apart from mechanically applying the
Guidelines to the offenders convicted in their courtrooms. 157 This is most
clearly demonstrated by the Act's overruling of Koon. Koon represented
the judiciary's conception of sentencing within the Guideline system. It
supported the notion that flexibility is an important component to the
sentencing system and district courts have an advantage in their proximity
to the facts of each case.' 58
Trial court judges need discretion because it is impossible to legislate
for every offender and every set of circumstances. 59 Therefore, departures
serve a vital role in sentencing structure to ensure that offenders receive
appropriate sentences given the circumstances of the offense and the history
of the offenders. Discretion also serves an important role in checking
overzealous or unscrupulous prosecutors. 60  Without any room for
departures, prosecutors hold significant power since they are the only party
to a trial with the power to meaningfully alter sentences.'16 Under the Koon
system, sentencing decisions are afforded significant weight because
sentencing decisions occur in highly emotional circumstances and often rely
on confidential information and potentially valuable testimony regarding
the offender. Only clear errors in sentencing are corrected by the appellate
courts. 1
62
155 Michelle Lore, Amendment Limiting Judicial Discretion in Sentencing Receives Cool
Reception from Judges, 7 MINN. LAW. 1, 16 (2003).
156 Id.
157 See Lane, supra note 68, at A02.
158 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996).
"9 Id. at 92-96.
160 See Letter from the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, et al., to Congressional
Representative (Mar. 26, 2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/
2cddO2b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/departures/$FILE/FeeneyAmdtNACDL letter.pdf
(letter in opposition to the Feeney Amendment).
161 United States v. Kim, No. 03 CR. 413(RPP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18637, at *21-22
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2003).
162 Koon, 518 U.S. at 100.
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Although the PROTECT Act is still in its infancy, already the results
of the change in appellate review are showing.1 63 For example, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit overturned an Illinois District judge's
decision to grant a downward departure based on an offender's diminished
capacity, prior conduct as'a model citizen and deportable alien status.' 64 As
more and more downward departures are overturned by the appellate courts,
there will be increasing pressure on district court judges to limit departure
discretion for risk of being overturned. Therefore, de novo appellate review
of sentencing decisions will continue to be an important deterrent to
downward departures.
2. The United States Sentencing Commission Mandate
Perhaps the most overt attack on the judiciary came in the form of a
congressional mandate to restructure the United States Sentencing
Commission.165 The Commission was established as part of the Sentencing
166Reform Act of 1984 as an independent agency within the Judiciary. Prior
to the PROTECT Act, the Commission was comprised of seven voting
members, "[a]t least three" of whom had to be federal judges.167  The
PROTECT Act now provides that the commission consist of "[n]ot more
than 3" federal judges.168  Therefore the three-judge minimum was
transformed into a three-judge maximum, and could conceivably lead to a
Commission without any judicial representation at all.' 69 The restructuring
of the Commission sends an overt signal as to Congress's opinion that little
judicial input is needed in sentencing policy. 70  While much of the
PROTECT Act seeks to eliminate judicial discretion at the trial level, this
reform indicates that judicial input is similarly unappreciated in determining
the basic sentencing structure or rules of application.
163 See, e.g., United States v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 69-83 (1 st Cir. 2003).
164 United States v. Mallon, 345 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Press Release, Rep.
Tom Feeney, Feeney Amendment Protects Children: U.S. Court of Appeals Enforces Full
Sentence for Child Predator (Oct. 10, 2003), available at www.house.gov/
apps/list/press/fl 24_feeney/USCourtFeney.html.
165 See Berman, supra note 5, at part II; Groner, supra note 63.
'66 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2003) (no more than four members of the Commission can be
members of the same political party).
167 Id.
168 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2004).
169 Vinegrad, supra note 78, at 314.
170 Berman, supra note 5, at Part II; Groner, supra note 63; Roundtable, supra note 110




In Mistretta v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission as it was initially
constructed in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 11 In particular the
Court determined that Congress did not delegate excessive legislative
power to the Commission, nor did it violate the separation of powers
principle by placing the Commission in the Judicial Branch and requiring
federal judges to serve on the Commission. 17  The Commission's
placement in the judiciary and the requirement of federal judges on the
Commission are justified acknowledgements as to the "role that the
Judiciary has always played, and continues to play in sentencing.' ' 173 The
Commission's composition and placement within the judiciary was due to
the "judiciary's special knowledge and expertise.' 74 Judicial participation
ensures that "judicial experience and expertise will inform the promulgation
of rules for the exercise of the Judicial Branch's own business-that of
passing sentence on every criminal defendant."'
75
The PROTECT Act's reform of the composition of the Sentencing
Commission seriously damages the Mistretta rationale for incorporating the
Commission within the judiciary. Should the Commission wind up without
any judicial members there could well be potential separation of powers
issues regarding the Commission's placement within the Judiciary. The
Commission, in effect, would allow a political agency to "cloak their work
in the neutral colors of judicial action.' 76 Such a concern was articulated
by the Mistretta Court and would be of even greater concern without any
judicial representation on the Commission.
177
While drafting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as mandated by
Congress through the SRA, the Commission relied on two principles. First,
in establishing categories and particular sentencing ranges, the Commission
generally followed "typical past practice, determined by an analysis of
10,000 actual cases."' 7 8  Second, the Commission operated under the
assumption that it was a permanent body that would continuously revise the
Guidelines over time. 1 9 The Commission constructed the Guidelines with
171 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
172 Id.
173 Id. at 390.
174 Id. at 396.
171 Id. at 408.
176 Id. at 407.
177 ld.
178 Judge Stephen Breyer, The Key Compromises of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
in SENTENCING, JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND TRAINING, 105, 109 (Colin Munro & Martin
Wasik eds., 1992).
!79 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)-(p) (Supp. IV 1986) (2003).
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the understanding that they would adapt and evolve over time as the
Commission analyzed the results of their practical application. The
Commission was meant to "continuously, dispassionately and scientifically
evaluate sentencing trends, and do so transparently, not privately, with input
from the public, and proceed to adjust what naturally must be considered an
evolving body of law.
' So
The PROTECT Act operates to rebuke and marginalize the Sentencing
Commission. Congress adopted sweeping sentencing reform without so
much as consulting the Commission, until the substance of the legislation
was established.' 8' In doing so, Congress bypassed the guideline
amendment process which it created twenty years ago. 8 2 In addition, the
Act requires the Sentencing Commission to reduce the frequency of
downward departures regardless of the Commission's view on the necessity
of such change. 83 In response, on October 8, 2003, the Commission issued
five amendments to the sentencing guidelines, the Commission:
I) prohibited departures based solely on the existence of a plea agreement
2) prohibited a number of existing grounds for downward departures (acceptance of
responsibility, minor role in offense, gambling addiction, and legally required
restitution)
3) limited the availability of a departure based on family ties and responsibilities;
aberrant behavior; and similar circumstances
4) significantly limited both the availability and the extent of departures for certain
offenders with substantial criminal history
5) implemented a directive authorizing limited departures pursuant to early disposition
(fast track) programs authorized by the Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney 84
These amendments bear a striking resemblance to the Feeney
Amendment as originally introduced in the House.'85 It appears that several
of the compromises made in response to the outrage by a wide range of
judges, special interest groups, and lawyers to the proposed Feeney
Amendment have now reappeared under the guise of the Sentencing
Commission's amendments to reduce disparity. Irrespective of whose face
is on the changes, the prohibition of certain grounds for downward
departure, such as acceptance of responsibility and minor role in the
so Who's Afraid of the Federal Judiciary?, supra note 13, at 12.
181 Vinegrad, supra note 78, at 313.
182 Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 2, 101 Stat. 1266 (1987).
183 Vinegrad, supra note 78, at 315.
184 USSC Press Release, supra note 132.
185 Compare with Feeney Amendment as Introduced, supra note 126.
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offense, demonstrate that Congress is in control. The Commission can no
longer credibly stand for an independent agency that writes, evaluates and
amends the sentencing system in response to the ebb and flow of the
system, when it is now clear that Congressional mandates can (and have)
overridden their independence and purpose.'1 6 Finally, to further reinforce
this point the PROTECT Act tacked on a two-year prohibition to the
Commission from promulgating any new downward departure
guidelines. 8 7 In one fell swoop, Congress removed the requirement that
judges serve on the Commission, required the Commission to act in specific
accordance with its wishes to reduce departures, and paralyzed the
Commission by prohibiting any changes which may lead to new downward
departures for at least two years.1
88
3. The Reporting Requirements
The PROTECT Act amended the sentencing system to require the
court to include specific written reasons for departures. 189 In addition, the
Act requires the Chief Judge of each district court to ensure that, within 30
days following entry of judgment, that the court's statement of reasons for
sentencing is submitted to the Sentencing Commission.190  Without
permission from the presiding judge, Congress can access the report and the
supporting documents.' 9' Congressional access to certain confidential
documents utilized in the sentencing process raise serious privacy concerns
since sentencing materials are often very personal, detailed and involve
third parties. 92 Additionally, there are legitimate concerns regarding the
protection of information provided by informants or others who provide
substantial assistance to the government. 
93
The reporting requirements established by the PROTECT Act operate
to grant Congress greater supervisory control over the judiciary.'94 Like
much of the Act's reforms, the reporting requirement serves as a rebuke to
186 See Groner, supra note 63.
187 Final Version of the Feeney Amendment, supra note 13 1.
188 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 177 Stat. 659 (2003).
189 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2b04).
'90 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(2) (2004).
191 Urbina, supra note 2.
192 Id.
193 Roundtable, supra note 110 (John Steer, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n).
194 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.§ 401(h) (1)).
2004] 1095
ROBERT HOWELL
the Sentencing Commission and usurps its function as originally proscribed
by Congress in the SRA.
The greatest concern with the new reporting requirements mandated by
the PROTECT Act is that it will create a "judicial blacklist.' ' 95 Congress
now has the ability to review specific judges' sentencing orders. 96 Such
scrutiny is likely most effective against judges seeking appointments to
appellate courts, although most judges would not be appreciative of being
called before Congress to justify their decisions. 9 Any judges hoping to
gain appointment to appellate courts have tremendous incentive not to
downward depart since their future promotion will require Congressional
confirmation.1 98 The increased reporting requirements are premised on the
need for greater and more accurate sentencing data, however the names of
individual judges should not really be necessary for a workable dataset.
Requiring the names of individual judges contributes to the suspicions of
congressional blacklisting. 199
Judge Paul Magnuson summarized the concerns aptly in a post-Feeney
Statement of Reasons for Imposing Sentence:
The Court believes that the day of the downward departure is past. Congress and the
Attorney General have instituted policies designed to intimidate and threaten judges
into refusing to depart downward, and those policies are working . . . This reporting
requirement system accomplishes its goal: the Court is intimidated, and the Court is
scared to depart.
200
Another judge responded to the reporting system by saying "If
Congress wants to make a deck of cards for the judges like they did for the
bad guys in Iraq, then make me the ace of spades. 20°
It is unclear what effect the new reporting requirements will have on
downward departures. If nothing else, the anecdotal evidence regarding
judicial reactions to the reporting requirements suggests that judges are
certainly conscious of the intent of Congress to eliminate downward
departures. The real question is whether Congress will in fact require
judges who have high downward departure rates to justify their decisions.
195 Urbina, supra note 2.
196 id.
197 United States v. Kim, No. 03 CR. 413(RPP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18637, at *21
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2003).
198 Urbina, supra note 2.
199 Roundtable, supra note 110 (Statement of Gerald Lefcourt).
200 United States v. Kirsch, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1006-07 (D. Minn. 2003) (statement of
reasons for imposing sentence).
201 Urbina, supra note 2 (quoting Judge Sterling Johnson, Jr.).
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It is clear that one of the reasons why the sentencing system is subject
to attack by Congress is because the data collected by the Sentencing
Commission is flawed and incomplete.20 2 Therefore, better reporting is
necessary in order to determine whether there is an unwarranted disparity
problem and thus the extent of the problem.203 The PROTECT Act assures
greater detail and consistency in the reporting of sentencing data, however
the need for Congressional supervision is not justified if the Commission
were operating properly.
C. LIFE AFTER THE PROTECT ACT
After proposing the Feeney Amendment, Representative Tom Feeney
responded to criticism of the proposed reforms by writing that "I am
perplexed as to why an amendment that seeks to enforce the intent of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, is so controversial ...the intent of the
Sentencing Reform Act is not being carried out. ' '204  On its face, the
sentencing reforms implemented by the PROTECT Act do in fact seek to
enforce predictability and uniformity in sentencing. The SRA intended that
downward departures would be rare and established several safeguards to
ensure that the federal sentencing system provided a substantial measure of
predictability based on uniformity.0 5 The SRA relied on the Guidelines,
the Commission, reporting requirements that each sentencing judge provide
reasons for a given sentence, and the appellate courts to achieve
uniformity.20 6 Like the SRA, the PROTECT Act relies on a similar strategy
for enforcing uniformity in federal sentencing.0 7 The PROTECT Act,
while retaining the basic guideline system, reinforced the supplemental
measures to ensure uniformity such as increased appellate review, stricter
reporting requirements and a reconstitution of the Sentencing
Commission.20 8 Proponents of the PROTECT Act reforms simply see the
Act as a necessary reaffirmation and stronger enforcement of the principles
which were articulated by the SRA.209 There is little argument that the
202 USSC Report, supra note 16, at iv; Mercer, supra note 109.
203 Mercer, supra note 109.
204 Feeney, supra note 53.
205 See supra Section II.
206 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (1988).
207 Id. § 3553.
208 Id.
209 Lane, supra note 68, at A02 (Rep. Sensenbrenner: "[The PROTECT Act]
reestablishes Congress's original intent for fair and equal sentencing justice throughout the
federal judiciary"); Roundtable, supra note 110 (statement by Roslynn Mauskopf, U.S.
Attorney for the Eastern District of New York).
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PROTECT Act will in fact reduce judicial discretion to depart downward
and therefore will result in fewer offenders being sentenced below the
legislated guideline range. As a result, the federal sentencing system should
see significant increases in predictability and uniformity among individual
judges and across districts.
While some believe that the Feeney Amendment represents a natural
evolution of the federal criminal justice system, others see the new reforms
as a solution in search of a problem. Any reform to the Federal Sentencing
System is unlikely to receive much judicial support since it is effectively a
criticism of judges.210 Thus, there is an inherent tension in any sentencing
reform initiative. Few judges will support reform aimed at restricting their
discretion.21 ' However, any policy change affecting sentencing necessarily
requires judges to implement the reforms on a daily basis in their
courtrooms. This tension and the dysfunctional relationship between
Congress, the Department of Justice and the Judiciary bears much of the
blame for the perceived shortcomings of the SRA and thus the strong
reactions both in support of, and in opposition to, the reforms contained in
the PROTECT Act.23 2
The early returns from the PROTECT Act are unsurprising. The
reaction by the judiciary mirrors much of the criticism that was lodged
against the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.23 The similarity in criticism is
understandable because both the SRA and the PROTECT Act seek to
achieve the same objective in similar ways.214 Both sentencing reforms are
based on eliminating unwarranted sentencing disparity, and achieving this
goal through the reduction of downward departures. In particular, the two
acts function to seriously curtail unilateral judicial downward departures.
The sentencing uniformity message was clear in the SRA and it is equally
clear in the PROTECT ACT.
The primary difference in the two sentencing reform acts is in the
treatment and perception of the judiciary and the United States Sentencing




Both seek to achieve these goals through the guideline system in
2 0 Tebo, supra note 88.
211 See Lazarus, supra note 6.
212 Tebo, supra note 88.
233 Hatch, supra note 14, at 192; Lay, supra note 87, at 1760, 1767; Wilkins, Jr. et al.,
supra note 4, at 379-80.
234 Compare PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) with Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 2019 (1984), codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1984).
21' See Pub. L. No. 108-21; Pub. L. No. 100-182 (1987).
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conjunction with appellate review, statistical analysis of sentences, and
monitoring and adaptation of the sentencing system by the Commission.
However, The PROTECT Act suggests that the SRA relied too heavily on
the Commission and that the Commission failed in its execution and
supervision of the sentencing system. It appears some members of
Congress stopped trusting judges during the last several years.216  But
through the SRA, Congress was willing to preserve minimal judicial
discretion as long as it remained effectively checked. By Spring 2003, the
introduction of the Feeney Amendment signaled that some members of
Congress considered the system flawed and pointed the finger of blame
squarely in the direction of the judiciary and the Sentencing Commission.
While the Commission is subject to Congressional mandates and
therefore has little flexibility to oppose the PROTECT Act reforms, much
of the judiciary is fighting back. Many judges have been outspoken in their
opposition. 217  For example, in response to the Act, District Court Judge
John S. Martin published an Op Ed piece in The New York Times
announcing that he was resigning to protest the unjust nature of the
sentencing process and the PROTECT Act.218  Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist criticized the PROTECT Act reforms in his annual year-end
report on the state of the federal judiciary.219 One New York District Court
Judge recently issued a blanket seal on sentencing related documents before
him, forbidding Congress from examining the materials without his
permission.22° A California District Court Judge recently published an
order stating that the PROTECT Act's reporting requirements were
unconstitutional. 221 Finally, in reference to the PROTECT Act reforms, one
216 See Bowman, supra note 24, at A27 ("[IT]he PROTECT Act ... implicitly [assert],
that only members of Congress and functionaries at the Justice Department . . . are wise
enough to set sentencing policy."); Lore, supra note 155.
217 Hon. John S. Martin, Jr., Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at
A31 ("Every sentence imposed affects a human life .... For a judge to be deprived of the
ability to consider all of the factors that go into formulating a just sentence is completely at
odds with the sentencing philosophy that has been a hallmark of the American justice
system.").
218 Urbina, supra note 2; Mark H. Allenbaugh, The PROTECT Act's Sentencing
Provisions, and the Attorney General's Controversial Memo: An Assault Against the Federal
Courts, FINDLAW, Aug. 13, 2003, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/allenbaugh/
20030813.html.
219 See William Rehnquist, 2003 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2004),
reprinted at 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 143 (2004); Lane, supra note 68, at A02.
220 Urbina, supra note 2.
221 United States v. Mendoza, 2004 WL 1191118 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2004) (Order
Declaring Title IV of Section 401(l)(1)(2)&(3) Report of the Attorney General of the
PROTECT Act and Feeney Amendment Unconstitutional).
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judge suggested that "[t]he judicial branch should not be timid nor fearful
of inflicting an occasional whiplash or, where necessary, even imposing
chronic pain when Constitutional rights are threatened or the balance of
powers is jeopardized.,
222
In addition to the substantial judicial opposition, there is currently
legislation pending in both houses of Congress to repeal the Feeney
Amendment.223 Similar to the uproar created by the Feeney Amendment,
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 also met substantial opposition after its
introduction in 1987.224 Only time will tell whether the opposition to the
Feeney Amendment will have any affect this time around.
V. THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY
Whether or not the PROTECT Act reforms can be successfully
repealed, it is important to understand how the federal sentencing system
got to this point in the first place in order to prevent such sweeping
congressional reforms in the future. The PROTECT Act is the direct result
of the failures of the Commission and the judiciary in not alleviating
congressional concerns about sentencing disparity.22 5 For over twenty years
Congress has focused on the downward departure rate and anecdotal case
evidence of offenders "getting off easy. '226  This concentration on
uniformity has never been a secret.227 Therefore given Congress's concerns
and its actions through the SRA, the judiciary and the Commission should
have taken steps to prevent a reaction like the Feeney Amendment which
should have appeared inevitable for the last several years.
Instead the judiciary and the Sentencing Commission are reacting after
the amendment already had steam and could be supported by incomplete
and flawed data-the only kind available. Disparity does exist and it exists
222 Allenbaugh, supra note 218 (quoting Chief Judge Marilyn Hall Patel).
223 Kendall, supra note 5; Lane, supra note 68, at A02; Vinegrad, supra note 78:
'Judicial Use of Discretion to Guarantee Equity in Sentencing Act of 2003' ... this statute would
eliminate all provisions of the new sentencing statute other than those related to child-victim,
sexual abuse and obscenity crimes and instead require the Sentencing Commission to perform a
comprehensive study of downward departures and report to Congress within 180 days on the
results of its work.
/d. at 316.
224 Hatch, supra note 14, at 190; Lay, supra note 87, at 1760, 1767.
225 Berman, supra note 5, at 308.
226 Id.; Who's Afraid of the Federal Judiciary?, supra note 13, at 8 (Rep. Feeney:
"[L]egislative efforts . . . will be a fruitless gesture if at the end of the day judges give
offenders . . . a slap on the wrist . . . [which] is exactly what is happening today, with
increasing frequency.").
227 Berman, supra note 5, at 308.
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on several levels. Without an explanation as to why there is disparity in the
system, how much disparity exists, and a justification for its existence, the
sentencing system remains a sitting duck for congressional reform hell-bent
on achieving uniformity. Judicial blacklists, expulsion of the judiciary from
sentencing policymaking, and heightened appellate review represent a
congressional reaction to what appeared to be a failure of the SRA. It is
unlikely Congress would take the blame for the system's shortcomings, so
it should have been obvious to the Commission and the judiciary that the
only other place to lay blame was at their feet.
A closer look at the rationale for the Feeney Amendment and its
incorporation into the PROTECT Act raise several questions as to the
extent of the sentencing disparity problem. The value of the SRA and the
PROTECT Act are dependent on the evaluation of the need (or desire) for
departures from the guidelines. Departures of any kind are meant to be
rare. However, the definition of "rare" still remains unclear. Furthermore,
critics of the federal sentencing system see the current downward departure
rates as evidence of a flawed system, while others utilize the same statistics
as proof of a healthy and properly functioning system.
Currently there is considerable uncertainty stemming from the
Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington which could drastically
alter the federal sentencing guidelines and the role judges play within the
system.228 In addition, there exists a possibility that the current inability of
judges to depart downward as mandated by the PROTECT Act could
actually lead to a return of sentencing discretion to judges in the future.
Without judicial input any failures in the post-PROTECT Act system will
be exclusively attributable to Congress and the Guidelines. If incarceration
rates, length of sentences, and cases of perceived over-punishment increase
under the new system, concerned citizens and taxpayers may begin
demanding a more flexible sentencing system, or increased emphasis on
rehabilitation.229 Should this occur, little blame remains to lodge with the
judiciary. Thus, the pendulum could swing back towards more discretion
for sentencing judges and a greater role for the judiciary in sentencing
policy.
However, any such substantial reallocation of sentencing discretion
from Congress to the judiciary is quite unlikely in the foreseeable future,
given the prevailing views on crime with the voting public. Therefore, the
Sentencing Commission and the judiciary must develop a strategy to exist
within the current guideline system. In order to coexist with Congress and
228 See supra note 3.
229 See Allenbaugh, supra note 218; Lazarus, supra note 6; Satter, supra note 5.
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justify its participation in sentencing policymaking, the Commission and
the judiciary must develop a body of evidence explaining the role
downward departures should play in the system, a rationale for what
percentage of departures represents a properly functioning system, and
finally, a satisfactory body of statistical data supporting the fact that the
current system requires enhanced judicial discretion to depart. Like judicial
distaste for the constraints of the Sentencing Guidelines, the judiciary is
unlikely to embrace strict statistical evaluations of a well functioning
sentencing system as dictated by the Commission. However, given the
trend of Congressional usurpation of the traditional role of the federal
judiciary in sentencing, the PROTECT Act signals that the judiciary no
longer has a meaningful choice.
230
Until the Sentencing Commission and the judiciary are able to appease
Congress, legislative erosion of judicial discretion in federal sentencing
policy will continue. The PROTECT Act blindsided the judiciary and the
Sentencing Commission, striking a substantial blow to their discretion
during sentencing and their role in developing sentencing policy. 23' They
must now act to ensure that in the future they are better prepared to stave
off such efforts if they wish to preserve what minimal role in federal
sentencing that they now retain.
VI. CONCLUSION
The PROTECT Act's "reform" of the federal sentencing system was
the result of the congressional perception that the sentencing system
established by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was not achieving its
stated goal of uniformity. This perception was predicated on anecdotal
evidence and flawed downward departure statistics. Such evidence was at
best incomplete, and in the case of sentencing policy it is potentially
misleading. Despite the flawed evidence, the United States Sentencing
Commission and the judiciary were aware of the congressional concern
regarding downward departures prior to the introduction of the Feeney
Amendment and did little to deal with this concern. When confronted with
the reforms contained in the Feeney Amendment, the Sentencing
Commission and the judiciary were unable to adequately refute the
perception that unwarranted disparity existed within the system. The
PROTECT Act removes substantial discretion from trial court judges
during the sentencing process and effectively removes the judiciary from
230 See Lane, supra note 68, at A02 (the "traditional interchange between the Congress
and the Judiciary broke down").
231 See id.
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having meaningful input into future federal sentencing policy. In order to
prevent such a reaction by Congress in the future, the Sentencing
Commission and the judiciary must develop meaningful sentencing
statistics justifying the role of departures within the system and proving that
judges are not working around the system. Without such evidence the trend
of Congress usurping the traditional role of the judiciary in federal
sentencing will continue.
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